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INTRODUCTION
The Inkatha movement has received a great deal of publicity over the
few. years since, its revival, and especially with the; recent formation
of an alliance between tha ("Coloured") Labour Par.ty, Inkatha, and the
("Indian") Reform Party. This paper was done to suggest a possible
approach,, for. discussion, to the. analysis of currant political,
ideological, and economic: developments in the resexve/"homeland"
regions, of the. South African social formation* More specifically, the:
paper hopes to provide, information that could be relevant to an analysis
of some developments in the kwaZulu region. An elaboration of Hhese
hints at an approach along with integration of factors relating to the1
stage of capitalism dominant in the social formation and class struggle
would have made this a more satisfactory paper for discussion.
The approach adopted has to be extremely tentative at this stage, both
because of the immediate and obvious problems associated with
contemporary research and analysis (it is even less possible to
approach the subject with "objectivity", to "distance oneself from
it", than is the case with topics that can more properly be called
"history"), but also because of the dearth of material available on
the reserve/"homeland" regions and the difficulty of doing research in
these areas.
In the first section I will introduce certain concepts relating to
an analysis of the "homelands". I owe many of the ideas and concepts
in this section to two articles by Wolpe (li/olpe, 1975 & 1976), and
articles by Legassick and Jolpe (1576) and"Innes and O'Neara (1976),
and many of their ideas are borne out by the analysis in the second -c .
section. The second section deals specifically with the Inkatha
movement. Information relating to this movement is provided and one
issue is presented in greater detail, but no attempt is made to rigor-
ously apply the mode of analysis of the first section to the issues
around the position of Inkatha. Indicators exist but with so many
dynamics operative at this stage they can be no more than indicators.
However, I do not believe it to be possible to understand political,
economic and idfioloQical developments in the "homelands" without
keeping the questions raised in the first section in mind - and
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definitely impossible to come to an adequate understanding if these
areas are looked at in isolation, i.e. if apparently "internal" events
and processes are not situated within a context broadly defined by the
specific stage of the development of capitalism in South Africa (a stage
of monopoly capital dominance - and more specifically, industrial
monopoly capital), and without keeping in mind the history of class
struggle within the social formation.
SECTION ONE - Aspects of Class Formation in the South African "Homeland"
Areas.
Class formation has to be looked at in the complexity of an "histori-
cally determined system of social production" (see definition of class
quoted in Shivji, 1976:19). The configuration of classes in the South
African social formation and, more specifically, in the "homelands" can
only be understood if the analysis takes into account South Africa's
position on the periphery of the world capitalist system; the way in
which proletarianisation took place, and is still taking place; the
specific history of class struggle; etc.
It is not possible to do justice to even a summary of the background
necessary to an analysis of class alliances and struggle as it involves
the "homeland" regions. A few points need to be stressed though.
Initial penetration in South Africa was done through the operation of
merchant capital. Biased demands were made on the pre-capitalist
modes of production. In other words, because the exploitative mechanisms
of merchant capital operate in the sphere of exchange, it was not necessary
to alter the relations of production in these pre-capitalist modes of
production (pre-Cf'iPs) fundamentally. Forces of production, on the other
hand, had to be revolutionised because of the increase in demand for
commodities to become part of the capitalist process of circulation
(exchange relations). I am not suggesting that it is possible to alter
one set of relations without disruptive effects on the other - "A mode
of production is an articulated combination of relations and forces
of production structured by the dominance of the relations of production"
(my emphasis) (Hindess & Hirst, 1975:9). Hut no attempt was, and probably
could be, made to institute capitalist relations of appropriation of
surplus value at this early stage.
During this period limited demands for wage, or tenant, labour were made.
However, with the discovery of first diamonds and then gold this demand
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for labour grew rapidly and the South African system of compound control
and migratory labour slowly developed - some aspects consciously
instituted while others developed "naturally". Motivated by the needs
of expanded reproduction of capital, the control and reproduction of _ .
labour power function of the reserve areas became institutionalised
- control over political developments in these areas and over labour
flows. Proletarianisation of the rural population proceeded rapidly -
and labour wast and is, absorbed not only from the South African
population but from the whole of southern Africa.
A specific aspect of this process of primitive accumulation in South
Africa was the maintenance of pre-capitalist economic forms - even
after the stage of merchant capital dominance. (I would argue that
it is not possible to speak of pre-capitalist modes of production
co-existing with a dominant CMP - other than in a period of transition
- but rather of forms of production under a capitalist mode of production).
Dominance of the Cf'lH "mainly tends (the predominant tendency) to expanded
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production, that is, to
dissolution of the other modes of production and subsumption of their
agents to capitalist production relations" (Bettelheim, 1972:297).
This predominant tendency arises out of the nature of appropriation of
surplus labour in the form of surplus value under the CMP. The CNfJ
demands the "freedom" of the labourer from control over the means of
production, "free" to sell his/her labour ("the period of time for which
he is free to sell his labour-power is the period of time for which he
is forced to sell it" - Marx, 1976:415). If relations of production
under a pre-CMP allowed.control over the means of production, e.g.
appropriation of surplus labour on the ideological level as in the
feudal mode of production while the peasant maintains control over
production, that control has to be destroyed in order to create the
paradoxical situation of "free forced" labour.-
However, Bettelheim points out that the predominant tendency is
combined with another, "secondary tendency, that of 'conservation-
dissolution' " (1972:2^7). In other words, restructuring of the pre-CMPs
(i.e« subordination-conservation) take place under the dominance of
the Cr-iP. This is especially true of the system of labour exploitation
that developed in South Africa. Such a restructuring of the relations
and forces of production of the pre-CflPs has taken place that the most
important aspect to these becomes their subordinated articulation with
the relations and forces of production of the CMP.
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To recognise that "conservation" has taken place and that it has been
functional within the specifics of the South African system of labour,
exploitation is not to argue that the function has remained the same
over time. Articulation between pre-capitalist forms and the CP1P has
undergone changes as the needs of the stages of development of
capitalism have changed, and as the nature and intensity of class
struggle changed and fluctuated. Nor is it to argue that articulation
occurs only on the economic level. Uithin a social formation the
reproduction of the conditions for capital accumulation takes place
on the economic as well as on the political and ideological levels.
Articulation between modes of production has to be analysed at the
same level of abstraction as that at which the concept "social
formation" functions (see hoss, 1977:18-24), in other words,
articulation between the CMP and other forms has to be looked at in
the complex inter-relationship of economic* political and ideological
factors.
Tor example, conservation of pre-capitalist forms, in various ways
essential to exploitation in South Africa, "tend to be expressed not
in terms of the relations of class exploitation they must sustain,
but in racial, ethnic, national .terms" (liiolpe, 1975:244). The political
policy of apartheid, or rather the political elements of the policy of
apartheid, and the way in which this policy finds ideological expression
is designed to strengthen this tendency. It is then necessary to see
what the implications are of conservation and this mode of expression
of relations of exploitation both in terms of class formation within
the "maintained" areas of the South African social formation (the
reserves/"homelands"), and also in terms of perception and nature of
class struggle. It could be expected that class struggle/opposition
could be perceived and expressed in similar terms to those in which
exploitation is expressed, i.e. racial, ethnic and national terms.
Also that the competition for the meagre benefits to be derived from
fulfilling roles in the "maintenance" of the reserve areas could occur.
These are points to be examined and illustrated in Section Two below).
Two main arguments on the role and alliances of the petty bourgeoisie
(black; in South Africa can be advanced. The one sees the deprivation
and discrimination against the African petty bourgeoisie leading to
alliances with black workers and peasants, rather than across the
colour line with their white equivalents. The only groups who could
possibly find enough benefit in supporting the policy of "separate
development" would be administrators and a possible commercial
bourgeoisie within the reserves.
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On the other hand the alliances between classes and the interests of
classes and fractions of classes may not be as "obvious" along
racial lines as the first position would argue. If a "convergence of
interests" does occur it has to be analysed in terms of the conditions
that produce it. The positions in possible alliances entered into
by the petty bourgeoisie can only be understood if the conjuncture is
analysed.
I will take up this second position and expand on that. The first very
necessary distinction to be drawn in an anlysis of the role of the
petty bourgeoisie is that between the new and the traditional petty
bourgeoisie.(cf. Wolpe, 1976:12-13, and Innes & O'Pleara, 1976:77)
Poulantzas defines the traditional petty bourgeoisie as "small-scale
producers and small traders (small property). They include forms of
artisanal work and small family businesses in which one and the same
agent is both owner of the means of production and of labour and is the
direct worker " (1973:37;; and the new petty bourgeoisie, "which tends
to increase under monopoly capitalism", as "non-productive wage-earning
workers...(and)... civil servants employed by the state and its various
apparatuses. These workers do not produce surplus value. Like others,
they sell their labour-power and their wage is determined by the price
of reproducing their labour-power, but they are exploited by the direct
extortion of surplus labour, not by the production of surplus value."
(Poulantzas, 1973:37)
A second necessary distinction is that between the petty bourgeoisie
in the reserves and those in the "white" areas. This distinction refers
to the difference in the relations between these groups/components
and the conditions of the social formation as a whole.
(It may be necessary to introduce further distinctions in order to
obtain a more complete picture of clasa formation as it relates to
the petty bourgeoisie. For example, to what extent is the category
of the "marginal pole of the economy" (Quijano, 1974) useful in
analysing class positions - this is undoubtedly a growing economic
sector. Some of the members of this group could sympathise with the
proletariat from unit.:.) ^ .hey have been forced and/or to which they hope
to return; and it is possible to start talking of a bureaucratic
petty bourgeoisie (cf. Shivji, 1976:63-66), to refer to that section
of; the new petty bourgeoisie situated in the "homelands" who are
attempting to secure an independent economic base - 'independent'
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pressure that could be exerted on, for example, traders through the
Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC).
In other words, what is important in analysing the position of the
petty bourgeoisie is "the place they occupy in the historically deter-
mined system of social production", and this includes political,
ideological, as well as economic factors.
SECTION ThJO - Introduction.
As has been mentioned above, this section will' deal specifically with
the Inkatha movement. Under A_ some information on the structure and
history of the organisation will be provided and also a look at the
movement through the speeches of Chief Buthelezi, president of
Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National Cultural Liberation Movement:
Inkatha) and the Chief Minister of kwaZulu, This does, not mean that
I take the many statements, speeches and letters, made and written by
Buthelezi as reflecting the functioning and interests represented by
Inkatha (or through Inkatha), but they do indicate (if only through
repetition) the attitudes of a co-founder of the movement and the wishes
for the organisation of a very prominent member. Certain recurring
themes will be examined, e.g. the strategy employed by Inkatha - in
relation to "homeland" politics, unity of the oppressed - and also the
Chief's and, therefore, the National Council's attitude to "free
enterprise".
Sub-section £ is an examination of one of the few concrete issues
around which individuals and organisations (representing economic
interests) have taken positions. This is the tri-partite agreement
controversy that has, at the time of writing, still not been completely
resolved. Another such issue, on which I unfortunately do not have
enough information is that of changes, or suggested changes, in the
land tenure system in kwaZulu.
A1 - Background.
The Inkatha organisation claims to represent more than 120 000
paid-up members (cf. 5AIHR, 1977:2; DM,25/4/77; NM, 27/5/77) and
Buthelezi probably has the support of several times that number of
Zulu-speakers, if nnt among other races nnr* othnic groups. How
efficiently this vast number of peoplp is bp.inr) tied into the organ-
isational anJ decision-making structure is difficult to say. The
structure makes provision for many levels of partic:pntion, e.g.
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and the Progressive Party. These unity moves have drawn the wrath of
the Afrikaans Press (accusations of Zulu "imperialism") and guarded
support from the English-language newspapers (see, e.g., editorial
comment Rapport, 15/1/78; ST, 15/1/78; Star, 12/1/78).
What practical cooperation beyond the obvious and important symbolic
value, is going to come from the alliance remains to be seen. The
issue of "black unity" will be returned to below.
A2 - The Rhetoric of Mobilisation: "populism"'; "nationalism"; "unity";
and "a tradition of opposition".
"•••(It) is important to note that whatever the weaknesses
of the populist framework as a description of reality, ideas
that may be called populist serve wide-ranging purposes as
political rallying-cries, both for those in power and for
those in pursuit of power. The major aspect of such 'populisms1
.., is the stress upon solidarity and the unity of vast sections
of the populace that it provides: a populism is thus a creed
most attractive to leaders. In very many cases the stress upon
solidarity will represent neither the real situation of
the mass of the people, nor their views of that situation ....
Rather it will represent an aspiration to make a particular
view as to the characteristics that unite people prevail over
any continuing elements that divide. Instead of assuming
solidarity to be the actual norm therefore, it is wise to look
to the tensions between the various elements and various
perspectives as defining the dynamic of any so-called
'populist1 movement" (my emphasis) (Saul, 1970:143-4).
Saul points out that there are weaknesses in the concept of
•populism'. It is, however, an accurate description of the rhetoric
employed. An analysis that starts off with the descriptive term
(describing an ideological position)needs to move beyond this frame-
work to analyse the "tensions between various elements and various
perspectives". This could possibly throw more light on the interests
being served by those appealing to a populist unity. Indicators as
to where these tensions might lie, have been mentioned in Section One.
Buthelezi has repeatedly, over the years, come out with an appeal that
specifically denies divisions or, positively, called for groups to
unite in the interests of "the strisjgls of the black man in Southern
Africa" (BS, 22/6/75:2). "It ;Inkatha) is not meant to be a political
faction since its constitution rejects all partisanship in our struggle
for self-realisation. We do not want to have divisive factions at this
crucial time ..." (85, 22/6/75:2). Possibly the clearest statement
on thi3 issue - repeated in the same words more than a year later -
is that on "black nationalism": "The bricks of black nationalism are
many and varied. There are ethnic groups, there are tribes, there are
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trade unions, drama societies, black church groups, student organisations,
cultural groups and many others" (BS, 14/3/76:17; also BS, 16/2/77:3).
This unity also bridges generation gaps (cf. BSf 13/-11/77: 8).
Tuo months later, in 1976, the call for unity was repeated, motivated
in. terms of all blacks being "fellow victims of apartheid" with a need
for "co-ordinating all our joint efforts to fight our common enemy,
who is the oppressor responsible for our common plight" (BS, 8/5/76:
18-19). The cause for division does not lie in the different interests
of various black groups but is caused by oppression itself - African
nationalism feeds on itself because of oppression, aided by the policy
of "divide and rule".
Addressing migrant workers in the SJ Smith Hostel in Durban,
Buthelezi had this to say:
"It is true that I believe in trade unions. I believe that
workers can only have machinery for negotiation between them-
selves and management through trade unions. Having said this,
let me emphasise that we are however not oppressed only as workers
in South Africa. . ide are not oppressed only as peasants. Nor
are we oppressed as an educated elite... uie are oppressed
in South Africa on the basis of our black skins. We have therefore
to unite as blacks if we intend dealing with our problem i
decisively" (BS, 28/8/76; also 28/8/77:10).
This theme is repeated regularly in speeches. In his opening address
to the Women's Brigade Annual General Conference, Buthelezi spoke about
"an organisation which embraces all sections of our black community
without any distinction of class ••• or any other distinction"• And,
"(t)here should be-: no room for fights between slaves. The priority
for slaves is to break the chains of their bondage" (BS, 29/10/77:8-9;
also 27/5/77:3).
While it is undoubtedly true that blacks suffer a common discrimination
in South Africa, making the populist appeal close to an experienced
reality, the differences in relations of exploitation as it effects
different classes do ultimately lead to conflicting interests. The
reality of continuing exploitation in a post-indepBddance situation
has led to class conflict within black society despite the rhetoric
of a unifying racial oppression.
But how is this unity seen within a strategy of liberation, and how
is "cultural liberation" defined? At the second ordinary session of
the Inkatha National Council, Buthelezi quoted Amilcar Cabral on
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"cultural liberation" as "an attempt ... to assert thB cultural
personality of the oppressed people in an act of rejection of that of
the oppressor ... whatever may be the. state of subjection of a nation
to foreign rule and the infuence of economic, political and social
factors in the furtherance of this domination, it is generally in
culture that the need to protest, leading to the emergence and
development of the liberation movement, is found" (BS, 8/7/7 6:15-16)•
Professor SME Bengu, secretary-general of Inkatha, in a series of
lectures published in 1977, said that;
"Cultural liberation as a philosophy can only be adopted by _• . .
people who, after analysing their situation, have realised
that their domination is not only a political one - but that
it covers the various aspects of culture such as the •.
educational, economic, political and spiritual areas. It is
at such a point that the oppressed people decide to bring
about a cultural liberation of their country on various
fronts" (Bengu, 1977:5).
It is a strategy of "various fronts" or artmulti-strategy" that is the
topic in. many of Buthelezi1s more recent speeches. This goes along
with the stated policy of using "homeland" structure as a base from
which to operate. The first two public references to Inkatha
(referred to above) stress the need for united mass action. There
is, however, some conflict, over the extent of black unity. At times
Buthelezi stresses an ethnic, or Zulu national, approach asra! -
qualification to a national approach. He does, for example, repeatedly
point out his traditional position of authority to counter
accusations that he owes his position to "homeland structures"
(e.g. BS, 8/5/76:37; 12/5/76:3.; 20/9/74:6; 30/4/76:57-8; 13/11/77:5),
The more common position is, however, that of a national approach -
"There is no Zulu freedom that is distinct, from the black man's
freedom in South Africa" (BS, 14/3/76:27; also 8/5/76; 23/8/76:4;
/10/73) - and argues that "homeland" politics provide thB base from
which to act ("We regard kwaZulu as a base for regional administration
and local development." - BS, 8/7/76:3; 18/5/73:4).
The multi-strategy approach was spelt, out in greatest detail in a speech
at Portland University and is worth quoting at some length:
"Realism demands that we do not think simplistically in
military terms and that we recognise that a strategy which
can be shared by all is necessary if we want to bring about
liberation in the foreseeable future. If no single movement
will bring about the collapse of apartheid, no single strategy
will do so either ... If progressive forces haue to be mustered,
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£ - Tripartite-Companies (Tripcos)
The manner in which Inkatha, or the threat of mobilisation of the move-
ment, can be used is fairly clearly illustrated by the issue of tri-
partite companies. This section will look at the conflict around the
issue in some detail. Some introductory remarks are necessary.
The conflict was basically between Butholozi, supporting and acting
on behalf of capital involved mainly in the circulation of commodities
on. the one hand, and on the other the urban-based section of the
traditional petty bourgeoisie. They were,and are, directly threatened
by the benefits of the enormous scale of operation of the chain stores
(in many cases linked to productive monopoly capital). Even if, in some
cases, the traders involved are operating on a large scale it is not
comparable with say Greatermans and OK Bazaars,
There occurred a split in the class of small-scale owners, in keeping
with their "in-between" position, between that section (apparently
manily involved in operations in rural areas - an African can only
obtain a site in a residential area if he/she has no trading interests
outside the residential area) supporting Buthelezi and Inkatha ( and,
therefore, tripcos), and those, mainly urban members of Inyanda (Natal
and Zululand African Chamber of Commerce) opposing tripcas and later
also Buthelezi and Inkatha.
The conflict, a struggle against proletarianisation, was also marked
by an initial attempt to maintain it on the level of the economic.
At least this was the case with Inyanda members (or rather, while
opposition was organised through Inyanda). Buthelezi, on the other hand,
immediately "escalated" the conflict to include issues of "benefit to
the masses" and support for the KLA and Inkatha - in other words, a
political struggle through political organisations. By the time the;
"opposition" attempted political organisation they had lost the fight
and had to rally round previously defeated and discredited political
figures (e.g. Barney Dladla, former Councillor for Community Affairs,
and the King)o
"I am not exaggerating when I state that this is one of those
occasions, when I feel that the problems we encountered in
bringing about this project was really worth our while.
Uefore birth there is pain and suffering. It can be truth-
fully said that some pain and suffering alp:i heralded the
birth of this project" - Chief Buthelezi at the fiadadeni
opening of Chcckers-KwaZulu (BS, 24/11/77:1).
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During October, 1974, the Prime Minister announced that "the time had
arrived" for "homeland" governments to decide for themselves on the
specifics of outside investment - in other words, on the terms under
which "white" capital would be allowed into the areas under their control.
This statement was welcomed by Assocom, the Afrikaanse Handels-Instituut
and the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC). (NPI, 4/10/74)
Initially it appeared that blacks had taken the initiative after this
invitation and decided, on the most satisfactory way in which ("white")
capital was to be admitted to the "homeland" areas. It was reported
(Nl% 20/5/75) that the Greatermans group would be operating in kwaZulu
as Checkers, if the support of the KLA and organised African trade
could be obtained. At. this early stage of the "tripco affair" it
appeared that the chain group (Greatermans) would have 5'\% of the
shareholding (to be reduced to 2b% after 10 years) while 49% would be
held by kwaZulu citizens and the kwaZulu Developemnt Corporation (in
fact the BIC as the regional development corporation did not exist).
Two further aspects of this initial news release need to be mentioned.
Firstly, the plans were revealed by Mr Zazi Kuzwayo, who quoted from
a BIC letter. This letter stated that the expansion of chainstores
into the "homelands" through tripco agreements had tfte support of the
Minister of Bantu Administration and Developemnt. (Kuzwayo had by late:
1973 received loans to the value of R1B7 000 from the BIC (NPl, 25/8/73),
and made the news at this time for attacking opponents of the BIC,
especially those in Inyanda. Amongst other properties Kuzwayo owned
at that time 6 shops in Clermont outs id e Pinetown, a shop at KwaPlashu,
and a bottlestore at Mapumulo).
Secondly, it was reported at this stage that the tripco idea had originated
from the National African Federated Chambers of Eommerce (NAFCOC),
"and this resolution was believed to have flowed out of the. favourable
impression made on African traders when Checkers helped fir Uinnington
Sabela, an Umlazi businessman, set up his own supermarket" (NFIt 20/5/75).
(Sabelo was given a loan of FU87 000 by the BIC early in 1974 to build
a shopping centre, and commented: "I want to bring West Street (Durban's
main shopping street) to U;.:lazi township").
By the end of June, 1975, the battlelines had been fairly clearly
drawn. On the 24th June iJhief Gatsha Buthelezi came out strongly in
support of tripcos, and at the same time issued a warning to Inyanda
"not to attempt to create a split between his Government and African
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in Natal and Zululand ... to develop progressively on their own."
Checkers would destroy "all the small African traders. We must build
our own retail orgahisations and while this is being done - it could
take 20 years to have fully developed African trading - the African
consumer must suffer." In other words the African traditional petty
boyrgeoisie (and under the racially discriminatory effects of apartheid
also a possible commercial bourgeoisie) are attempting to stem the
effects of the "tendency for the petty bourgeoisie- to be undermined
and eliminated in a capitalist formation: Lenin described it as a
'transitional class1" (Poulantzas, 1974:238).
Buthelezi denied that the Checkers agreement would "destroy all the
small African traders" - quite correctly, as the agreements were at
that stage for outlets at Umlazi, Kwaf'iashu and f-iadadeni. Wholesale
facilities to be offered by Checkers would aid traders operating in
areas outside those covered by the store's retail operations. This
split in the interests of the traders was to aid Buthelezi later.
He also defended the tripcos in terms of his Cabinet's "development
policy"•
Two new developments, to increase in importance, were now mentioned
(August, 1975): it was reported that "the tri-company scheme has
become part of KwaZulu development policy and also found instant
acceptance with the Zulu liberation movement, Inkatha, at its conference
in Nongoma recently" and; Zazi ! huzuayo suggested that Zulus would
like him to lead in "all spheres, not just business" (fJR, 6/8/75).
On the 10th August Inyanda rejected tripcos, and eleven days later
the kuaZulu goverment decided to accept the Greatermans proposal.
A few days later NAFCUC, meeting in Umtata, rejected the kwaZulu
cabinet decision. This goes against the reported earlier support by
fOAFCUC, and even that the partnership agreement had been suggested by
NAFCGC. It could have been that KAFCUC had expressed support for aid
directly to traders, as in the example cited of Uinnington 3abelo.
In Hay, 1976, Patrick Gumede (then vice-president of rj/"FCOG) denied
that the tripco proposals had originated from this bociy - he
claimed that the "tri-company concept was infused into the minds of
the homeland governmsnts by the Bantu Investment Corporation"
(ht-i, 24/5/76). This seems to be the most likely explanation as the
BIC has such extensive control over economic activity in the
"homelands"•
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Further developments during 1975 were the reported acceptance of the
tripco proposals by Inyanda, and a vote of confidence in the kwaZulu
government at the same meeting. A statement urns also made that Inyanda
had not "solicited the help of opponents of the KwaZulu Government11.
Later Khuzwayo reiterated his opposition to the tripco deals but
 :.
reaffirmed his support for the kwaZulu government. In November it was
reported (Nfl, 18/11/75) that Inyanda "angrily rejected the tripartite
concept tuo weeks earlier" and that "Zulu consumers (had) bought
R186 000 worth of shares in the scheme" (this aspect was not followed
up and who the "consumers" were is not.clear),
In December Buthelezi moved the conflict into the party political arena
once more. He claimed that he uas "testing public opinion" through
Inkatha meetings. The opposition to tripcos was being organised
into a political party (at this stage unnamed, but later to be revealed
as the Inala Party), Buthelezi said. Several traders, including Mr
Goqo, a Hammarsdale trader and member of Inyanda, and King Goodwill
were said to be involved,
Barney Oladla, former kwaZulu Councillor for Community Affairs, and
strong opponent to the scale and manner in which the BIC was involved
in kwaZulu economic activity, supported the Inyanda - "If we allow these
big boys in, the Black man will be wiped off the business map" (MR,
2D/12/75). During May, 1976, Dladla came under attack in the KLA for
having introduced an Inyanda motion that month opposing tripcos. It
was claimed:1 by the Councillor for Roads and Works that Gumede had
attacked Inkatha at the meeting and had hinted that he would have to
enter opposition politics.
rlore information on the Inala Party was released in 1976. Tension
immediately existed around the name of the party (inala being the name
of the King's first regiment), but it is not my intention to examine the
strain between Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill. Nor*" with the
information available to me, is it possible to examine accusations and
denials of Bureau for State Security/Department of Information
involvement in kwaZulu politics, and especially in the formation of the
Inala fJarty, In the KLA the party and tripco opposition was directly
linked when Goqo spoke on the issue. His comments are most revealing
of the ambivalent position that the petty bourgeoisie in "homelands"
find themselves in. Un tiie one hand they are aware of the relative
disadvantage with regard to the position of other races, as
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"nobody with hair like mine or yours could establish a business in a
white or Indian area"; on the other hand, "Black traders had been
'incited to jealousy' because the Black areas were the only crumbs they
possessed, having been ejected from White areas* It was not. easy,
he said, to have only those few areas and then to have them taken
away." (Nl% 15/5/76)
In June Buthslezi played the card he had been- threatening to use. The
influence that Inkatha had with traders in kwaZulu was tested at a meeting
called at Ulundi. As was mentioned above, Inyanda, in 1974, had a
membership of 413 out of the 1600 African businessmen in kwaZulu
(DN, 25/9/74), These members would probably be situated in the
townships around the main urban areas in Natal. The meeting was called .
in Ulundi, situated far from the urban areas. The Inyanda "was called
upon by KwaZulu traders to cooperate with the national liberation
movement, Inkatha, failing which the KwaZulu Government would have no
dealings with it" (NPl, 14/6/76). It is significant that discipline
was imposed not directly, but through ihe Inkatha movement. Inyanda
was advised "to avoid politics and concentrate on the economy"•
On 26th July, 1976, the first tripartite agreements were signed in :
Pretoria between the KLA, SIC and Greatermans (Checkers), S;?,sko
Milling (to be known as Umlazi 8akery)f and Aidec (African Insurance
Development Company). The signatories said that under the scheme
"an agreement is usually entered into between the White party, the
Olack interests if available, and the development body of a
particular homeland ... (T)he shares acquired by the BIC in the three
concerns would eventually be transferred to the KwaZulu Development
Corporation" (DN, 26/7/76).
The Sunday Tribune (22/8/76), under the headline "KwaZulu and Inyanda
Bury Hatchet" reported that the 18-month dispute had been settLed
in that Inyanda had "given its blossini" to the building of an inter-
national hotel at Ulundi, ind had also joined Inkatha. But an
international hotel is peripheral to the real issues involved in the
dispute, namely t-he survival of traders in the larger urban areas.
An hotel at Ulundi would fill a gap that no trader was going to move
into. So it comes as no surprise that just before the opening of
the first Checkers retail and wholesale outlet at Hadadeni Patrick
Gumede should once more express the Inyanda opposition to the scheme,
"because it meant a radical threat to rladadeni traders whose business
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would without doubt face drastic losses" (ON, 21/11/77). This statement
was made after the security police had been to warn Gumede that he and .
other traders would be held responsible if anything happened to the
supermarket. Threats of arson had reportedly been received.
Chief Buthelezi performed the opening of the Checkers supermarket on
24th November, 1977. He said that that was stage one - phase two
would include Edgars, Saleshouse, Get, Pep, KwaZulu Furniture Store,
Seares., Standard Sank and Bata. Despite Buthelezi's claim-that the .:
tripco development would keep money in kuaZulu, the firms on his list
seam to be well geared to recapture wages remitted from "white" areas.-
D.c N Olivier, Natal manager of the Corporation for Economic Developemnt
commented on opposition to tripcos. After dismissing the fears of ••
traders as unfounded he said that dividends on shares sold to traders
after the 10 year period could "according to CED viability studies
... give traders the same or an even higher return on investment as
most of them were realising on their existing investments. 'I am
not implying that traders should now abandon their undertakings, but
I suggest strongly that they start taking part, by way of shareholding,
in the tri-company schemes1" (NFl, 30/11/77).
The petty bourgeoisie, as a transitional class, has a tendency under
capitalism to either join the proletariat or the commercial bourgeoisie
I have tried to show that the political position of this class cannot
be deduced from a single factor, but only through the close analysis
of a range of factors. It is not even possible to group the whole of
the "homeland" petty bourgeoisie together. This has implications for
an evaluation of an organisation such as Inkatha.
page 311
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books and articles:
Bengu, Prof Sibusiso PIE - Cultural Liberation: principles and practices
1977 (University of Natal)
Bettelheim, C - "Theoretical Comments" in Emmanuel, A - Unequal
1972 Exchange: a study of the imperialism of trade (NLB)
Hindess, Barry A Paul Q Hirst - Pre-Capitalist nodes of Production -
1975 (RKP)
Innes, Duncan & Dan O'Pleara - "Class Formation and Ideology: the
1976 Transkei region" in Review of African Political Economy, 7
lewis, Jack - A Study of the Ciskei ... (African Studies Hons
1976 Dissertation, Rhodes University)
floss
 f Glenn - Towards a Concept of Transition from One node of
1977 Production to Another (Development Studies Honours
Dissertation, University of Uitwatersrand)
Poulantzas, Nicos - "On Social Classes" in MLR, 78
1973
- Fascism and Dictatorship (NLB)
1974
LJuijano Ubreg6n, Anibal - "The Marginal Pole of the Economy and the
1974 Piarginalised Labour Force" in Economy and Society. 3,4
SAIRR - "Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe" (Information Sheet No 1, 66/11,
1977 Natal Region)
Saul, John - "Africa" in Ionescu, Ghita & Ernest Gellner (eds)
1970 - Populism: its meanings and national characteristics
(Ueidenfeld)
Schlemmer, Lawrence a Tim Muil - "Social and Political Change in the
1975 African Areas: a case study of kwaZulu" in Thompson,
Leonard & Jeffrey Butler (eds) - Change in Contemporary
South Africa (University of California Press)
Shivji, Issa G - Class Struggles in Tanzania (Heinemann)
1976
Wolpe, Harold - "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: the South African
1975 case" in Uxaal, Ivor, Tony Darnett ADauid Booth (eds)
- Beyond the Sociology of Development (RKP)
- "The Changing Class Structure of South Africa: the
1976 African Petit-Bourgeoisie" (mimeo, University of Essex)
Newspapers (abbreviations in brackets):
Daily News (DN)
Natal Mercury (iJPi)
The Nation
The Leader
Rand Daily f lai l (nuh)
Rapport
Sunday Times (ST)
Sunday Tribune (STrib)
Other:(Abbreviations in brackets)
Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement or Inkatha
(Constitution)
Republic of South .-.frica, Government of KuaZulu, Debates of the
Legislative Assembly (Oebates)
page 312
Buthelezi Speeches (BS) referred to:
BS, 9-11/2/72:
BS, 1973:
BS, 18/5/73:
BS, 11/8/73:
BS, /1D/73:
BS, 28/10/73:
BS, 20/9/74:
BS, 22/6/75:
BS, 14/3/76:
BS* 8/4/76:
BS, 30/4/76:
BS, 8/5/76:
Opening Address - "Towards Comprehensive Development
in Zululand: a working conference" (ISR, University of
Natal, Durban)
Appropriation Bill, 1973,
Executive Councillor
Policy speech by the Chief
"The twenty-five years of Nationalist rule through
fBlackf eyes" (article for the London Times)
Speech to the Residents of Lamontville
A Short Address to the African People of Bethlehem
Address to the African People at Soweto
Message at the Annual Conference of the Natal Indian
Congress (Durban)
The Launching of the National Cultural Liberation
(Inkatha) at Kwal'iashu
"A Message to South Africa from Black South Africa"
(Jabulani, Soweto)
Address at the Opening of T&C Enamels Plant at Isithebe
"Dialogue or Confrontation" - Address to Suidkus
Kajuitraad (Umbogintwini)
Address on the Occasion of the Conferment of the Degree
of LCD (Honoris Causa) by the University of Zululand
BS, 12/5/76: Policy Speech
BS, 19-22/5/76
BS, 8/7/76:
BS, 23/8/76:
BS, 28/8/76:
BS, 10/9/76:
BS, 25/11/76:
BS, 16/2/77:
BS, 1/3/77:
BS, 12/3/77:
BS, 26/5/77:
BS, 27/5/77:
BS, 11/6/77:
BS, 14/7/77:
BS, 5/8/77:
"On the South African Free Capitalist System and Black
People of South Africa" (Graduate School of Business
Conference, Stellenbosch University. Held at Umhlanga
Rocks)
Inkatha National Council - Second Ordinary Session -
Presidential Address
Address at the Meeting of the Inmates of S3 Smith Hostel
(Durban)
Press Release on Visit to Riot-Torn Soweto
Address to Assocom Dinner (port Shepstone)
Speech at a Ceremony at which the KwaZulu Government
Hands over a newly-completed Pa'lace to His Majesty
Ingonyama Goodwill ka Bhekuzulu
A Short Presentation at UCLA
"The Dismantling of Racism in South Africa Calls for
New and Multi-Strategy Approaches" (Portland University)
Press Release (Oar Es Salaam, Johannesburg)
At the Opening of Akulu Chemicals (Isithebe)
Opening Address: Inaugural National Congress of the
Women's Brigade (Inanda Seminary)
Address to the Annual Attorneys' Dinner (fiaritzburg)
"The Employment of Strength far Liberation" (Ondini)
Opening of Hr Edward Mgobese's Supermarket (Eshowe)
page 313
BS, 28/8/77:
BS, 29/10/77:
85, 11/11/77:
BS, 13/11/77:
BS, 24/11/77:
Banquet: Nconla Employment Services (Pty)Ltd
Women's Brigade First Annual General Conference
(Ondini)
"Political Issues in a Changing South Africa"
(Johannesburg)
"Where are we and where do ue go from here"
(Umlazi Stadium)
Checkers-KwaZulu (Madadeni Opening)
